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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
If preferences of households, particularly their rates of time preference (RTP), are 
heterogeneous, there is no guarantee that a steady state exists other than corner solutions, 
and furthermore only the most advantaged household will eventually possess all the 
capital in the economy (Becker 1980). Also, if economic rents are obtained persistently 
and unevenly among households, there is also no guarantee of such a steady state 
(Harashima 2020a). Nevertheless, a sustainable heterogeneity (SH) can exist in which all 
optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are simultaneously satisfied 
(Harashima 20101, 20122). 
 Furthermore, Harashima posited the MDC-based procedure under which 
households keep their capital-wage ratio (CWR) at the maximum degree of comfortability 
(MDC) and showed that the behavior of households based on rational expectations (the 
behavior under the RTP-based procedure) is equivalent to that under the MDC-based 
procedure (Harashima 2018a3). Harashima also showed that if preferences of households 
are heterogeneous under the MDC-based procedure, there is no guarantee of a steady state 
(Harashima 2018a). Because behavior under the MDC- and RTP-based procedures is 
equivalent, it can be predicted that if households obtain economic rents persistently and 
unevenly, there is also no guarantee of a steady state, even under the MDC-based 
procedure. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether this prediction is correct, and 
I show that it is indeed correct. 
 
2  MDC-BASED PROCEDURE 
 
In this section, the MDC-based procedure is explained briefly following Harashima 
(2018a). 
 
2.1  “Comfortability” of CWR 
Let kt and wt be per capita capital and wage (labor income), respectively, in period t. 
Under the MDC-based procedure, a household should first subjectively evaluate the value 
of 
?̆?𝑡?̆?𝑡  where ?̆?𝑡 and ?̆?𝑡 are household kt and wt, respectively. Let Γ be the subjective 
valuation of 
?̆?𝑡?̆?𝑡  by a household and Γi be the value of ?̆?𝑡?̆?𝑡  of household i (i = 1, 2, 3, … , 
                                                     
1 (Harashima 2010) is also available in Japanese as (Harashima 2017a). 
2 (Harashima 2012) is also available in Japanese as (Harashima 2020b). 
3 (Harashima 2018a) is also available in Japanese as Harashima (2019). 
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M). Each household assesses whether it feels comfortable with its current Γ (i.e., its 
combination of income and capital expressed by CWR). “Comfortable” in this context 
means “at ease,” “not anxious,” and other similar feelings.  
 Let the “degree of comfortability” (DOC) represent how comfortable a 
household feels with its Γ. The higher the value of DOC, the more a household feels 
comfortable with its Γ. For each household, there will be a most comfortable CWR value 
because the household will feel less comfortable if CWR is either too high or too low. 
That is, for each household, a maximum DOC exists. Let ?̃? be a household’s state at 
which its DOC is the maximum (MDC). MDC therefore indicates the state at which the 
combination of revenues and assets is felt most comfortable. Let 𝛤(?̃?) be a household’s 
Γ when it is at ?̃?. 𝛤(?̃?) indicates the Γ that gives a household its MDC, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) is 
household i’s Γi when it is at ?̃?𝑖.  
 
2.2  Homogeneous population 
I first examine the behavior of households in a homogeneous population (i.e., all 
households are assumed to be identical).  
 
2.2.1  Rules  
Household i should act according to the following rules:  
 
Rule 1-1: If household i feels that the current Γi is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it maintains the same 
level of consumption for any i.  
Rule 1-2: If household i feels that the current Γi is not equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it adjusts its level 
of consumption until it feels that Γi is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) for any i. 
 
2.2.2  Steady state  
Households can reach a steady state even if they behave only according to Rules 1-1 and 
1-2. Let St be the state of the entire economy in period t and 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) be the value of 𝑤𝑡𝑘𝑡  
of the entire economy at St (i.e., the economy’s average CWR). In addition, let ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 be 
the steady state at which MDC is achieved and kept constant by all households, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶. Let also ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃 be the steady state under the RTP-
based procedure; that is, it is the steady state in a Ramsey-type growth model in which 
households behave based on rational expectations generated by discounting utilities by θ, 
where θ (> 0) is the RTP of a household. In addition, let 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 =?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃.  
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Proposition 1: If households behave according to Rules 1-1 and 1-2, and if the value of 
θ that is calculated from the values of variables at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 is used as the value of θ under 
the RTP-based procedure in an economy where θ is identical for all households, then 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) = 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃).     
Proof: See Harashima (2018a).  
 
Proposition 1 indicates that we can interpret ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 to be equivalent to ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃. This means 
that both the MDC-based and RTP-based procedures can function equivalently and that 
CWR at MDC can be substituted for RTP as a guide for household behavior.  
 
2.3  Heterogeneous population 
In actuality, however, households are not identical—they are heterogeneous—and if 
heterogeneous households behave unilaterally, there is no guarantee that a steady state 
other than corner solutions exists (Becker 1980; Harashima 2010, 2012). However, 
Harashima (2010, 2012) has shown that a sustainable heterogeneity (SH) at which all 
optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are simultaneously satisfied exists 
under the RTP-based procedure. In addition, Harashima (2018a) has shown that SH also 
exists under the MDC-based procedure, although Rules 1-1 and 1-2 have to be revised, 
and a rule for the government should be added in a heterogeneous population.     
 Suppose that households are identical except for their MDCs (i.e., their values 
of 𝛤(?̃?)). Let ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 be the steady state at which MDC is achieved and kept constant 
by any household (i.e., SH in a heterogeneous population under the MDC-based 
procedure), and let 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 . In addition, let ΓR be a 
household’s numerically adjusted value of Γ for SH based on its estimated value of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) and several other related values. Specifically, let ΓR,i be ΓR of household i, T 
be the net transfer that a household receives from the government with regard to SH, and 
Ti be the net transfer that household i receives (i = 1,2,3, … , M). 
 
2.3.1  Revised and additional rules 
Household i should act according to the following rules in a heterogeneous population:  
 
Rule 2-1: If household i feels that the current ΓR,i is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it maintains the same 
level of consumption as before for any i. 
Rule 2-2: If household i feels that the current ΓR,i is not equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it adjusts its level 
of consumption or revises its estimated value of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) so that it perceives that ΓR,i 
is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) for any i.  
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At the same time, the government should act according to the following rule:  
 
Rule 3: The government adjusts Ti for some i if necessary so as to make the number of 
votes cast in elections in response to increases in the level of economic inequality 
equivalent to the number cast in response to decreases. 
 
2.3.2  Steady state  
Even if households and the government behave according to Rules 2-1, 2-2, and 3, there 
is no guarantee that the economy can reach ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻.  However, thanks to the 
government’s intervention, SH can be approximately achieved. Let ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 be the 
state at which ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻  is approximately achieved, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝)  be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡)  at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 on average. Here, let ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻 be the steady state that satisfies SH under the 
RTP-based procedure, that is, in a Ramsey-type growth model in which households that 
are identical except for their θs behave generating rational expectations by discounting 
utilities by their θs. Furthermore, let 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻. 
 
Proposition 2: If households are identical except for their values of 𝛤(?̃?) and behave 
unilaterally according to Rules 2-1 and 2-2, if the government behaves according to Rule 
3, and if the value of θi that is calculated back from the values of variables at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 
is used as the value of θi for any i under the RTP-based procedure in an economy where 
households are identical except for their θs, then 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝) = 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻).  
Proof: See Harashima (2018a).  
 
Proposition 2 indicates that we can interpret ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 as being equivalent to ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻. 
No matter what values of T, ΓR, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) are estimated by households, any ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 can be interpreted as the objectively correct and true steady state. In addition, 
a government need not necessarily provide the objectively correct Ti for ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 even 
though the ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 is interpreted as objectively correct and true. 
 
3  HETEROGENEOUS ECONOMIC RENTS 
UNDER THE MDC-BASED PROCEDURE 
 
3.1  Economic rents from ranking value and preference 
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Harashima (2016)4 introduced the concept of ranking value and preference and showed 
that some people can obtain much higher incomes than ordinary people because ranking 
value and preference generate monopoly powers. Thanks to these monopoly powers, 
producers can obtain economic rents (profits). Because the concept of the ranking value 
of preference is new, this type of economic rent has not previously been studied or 
considered as a contributor to economic inequality.  
 Harashima (2017b) showed that ranking preference plays an important role in 
product differentiation, and the monopoly rents obtained from product differentiation 
resulting from ranking preference are essential for a firm’s prosperity. Because the 
strategy of product differentiation is one of the most important for companies (Porter 
1980, 1985) and is actually pursed by many companies, the monopoly rents generated 
from differentiation will be large and widespread across the economy today and in the 
future. Furthermore, Harashima (2016, 2018c, 2018d) showed that these monopoly rents 
will be distributed very unevenly within a firm, team, or organization. In particular, they 
will be distributed largely to a few relatively more talented persons. 
 Individuals who do not obtain “ranking monopoly rents” (monopoly rents 
derived from ranking, see Harashima 2020a) suffer decreases in their labor and capital 
incomes because the total production (total income) in an economy does not increase as 
a result of the generation of ranking monopoly rents (i.e., people are in a situation that 
can be represented as a zero-sum game). In other words, to compensate for the ranking 
monopoly rents distributed to some people, the incomes of other persons must be reduced 
by the same amount directly or indirectly through lower wages or higher prices. Therefore, 
some amount of income from one group of households is transferred to, or exploited by, 
people in the other group (i.e., those who receive the ranking monopoly rents). 
 An important nature of ranking monopoly rents is that it is likely that some 
particular family lines will obtain them and, conversely, the incomes of some other family 
lines will consistently be reduced. To be in the position to obtain ranking monopoly rents, 
some types of special abilities—particularly higher abilities than those of ordinary 
people—will be necessary. Because of the nature of heredity, some family lines may have 
higher probabilities of having such abilities and thereby obtaining the rents. These family 
lines may obtain monopoly rents “persistently” in the sense that the mean of monopoly 
rents they obtain over generations is positive. Hence, there will not only be “temporary” 
ranking monopoly rents for some individuals, but also “persistent” ranking monopoly 
rents for some family lines.  
 
                                                     
4 Harashima (2016) is also available in Japanese as Harashima (2018b). 
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3.2  No guarantee for a steady state other than corner solutions 
Suppose that there are persistent economic rents that are distributed unevenly among 
households and that households behave unilaterally, i.e., that a household behaves without 
considering the optimality conditions of other households. Furthermore, such a household 
behaving unilaterally generally supposes that other households behave in the same 
manner as it does (i.e., that households, including itself, are identical) because a 
household that behaves unilaterally is basically indifferent to the fates of other households 
and does not care about differences among households (Harashima 2019). For simplicity, 
it is assumed that the only heterogeneous factor is the amount of persistent economic rents 
that a household obtains, or which are exploited by other households. In other words, 
households are identical except for the amounts of persistent economic rents. 
 In theory, the real interest rate in the market in period t (rt) is uniquely determined 
to be equal to the value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡 of the entire economy where yt and kt are per capita 
production and capital of the economy in period t, respectively, and the value of rt is 
common knowledge for all households. If all households are identical, the value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡 
that is perceived by them will be identical, but if they are heterogeneous, a household 
does not necessarily use the value of rt as its perceived (or guessed) value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡 because 
the value of rt is not necessarily the value of rt at steady state and the stream of rt starting 
from the present is guessed differently by different households under the heterogeneous 
scenario. That is, if households are heterogeneous, the values of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡 that are perceived 
(or guessed) by the households will also be heterogeneous. 
 In addition, a household does not necessarily know the correct amount of 
persistent economic rents that it obtains, or which are exploited by other households, 
because rent incomes often have large fluctuations and because it is difficult to distinguish 
between rent incomes and non-rent incomes and between temporal and persistent rent 
incomes. Hence, a household guesses the amount of its persistent economic rents but does 
so incorrectly. When it guesses the amount, therefore, it will tend to be bounded or largely 
influenced by the information it obtained through its personal experiences. 
  Under an environment in which the guessed streams of rt and the guessed 
amounts of persistent economic rents are heterogeneous among households, how does a 
household perceive (or guess) the value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡 ? If a household obtains persistent 
economic rents but cannot correctly know their amount, its income will tend to be 
unexpectedly larger than the amount implied by the market value of rt. This means that 
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the household will tend to increase its capital to maintain its CWR at MDC in accordance 
with Rule 1-2. At the same time, if the household behaves unilaterally, i.e., it generally 
supposes that the other households behave in the same manner as it behaves, it estimates 
that the capital accumulated in the economy will increase to a greater amount in the future 
than the amount that is implied by the market value of rt. As a result, the household will 
tend to perceive (guess) a lower value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡 than the market value of rt. 
 On the other hand, if a household does not obtain persistent economic rents but 
instead is exploited by other households that obtain persistent economic rents, and if that 
household cannot correctly know the amount of persistent economic rents that has been 
exploited by other households, its income will tend to be unexpectedly smaller than the 
amount implied by the market value of rt. The result is that the household will decrease 
its capital in order to maintain its CWR at the MDC. If the household behaves unilaterally 
and generally supposes that the other households behave in the same manner as it behaves, 
it will estimate that the capital in the economy will also decrease to a lower amount in the 
future than the amount that is implied by the market value of rt. As a result, the household 
will tend to perceive (guess) a higher value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡 than the market value of rt. 
 Because the values of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡  perceived (guessed) by households are 
heterogeneous, household capital is accumulated differently among different households. 
Because households will often make incorrect guesses of the amount of persistent 
economic rents and are influenced by their personal experiences, when the amount of 
persistent economic rents of a household becomes larger, the household will tend to 
perceive (guess) a lower value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡, by the same reasoning as shown above, and will 
accumulate more capital as a result. Similarly, when a household is exploited more by 
other households, the household will tend to perceive (guess) a higher value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡, and 
therefore it will accumulate less capital.  
 
Proposition 3: If households are identical except for the amounts of persistent economic 
rents that they obtain, or which are exploited by other households, and if they behave 
unilaterally according to Rules 1-1 and 1-2, all capital is eventually owned by the 
household with the largest persistent economic rents.  
 
Proof: The value of rt is determined to be equal to the value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡 of the entire economy, 
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and the capital of the entire economy accumulates according to the value of rt. However, 
because households are heterogeneous and behave unilaterally, they accumulate their 
capital differently on the basis of the values of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡 that they separately perceive (guess). 
 As shown above, the value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡 perceived (guessed) by a household that is 
exploited more tends to be higher than the market value of rt, and a household whose 
personal valuation of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡 is higher than the value of rt accumulates less capital than it 
estimated because the value of rt is lower than its perceived (guessed) value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡 . 
Therefore, by Rule 1-2, the household decreases its consumption in order to increase its 
capital so that its CWR will approach its value at the MDC. However, in accordance with 
the same reasoning of accumulating less capital when personal valuation of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡 is higher, 
even after it makes this adjustment, the household will still tend to accumulate less capital 
than it had estimated. Hence, by Rule 1-2, it tends to decrease its consumption further, 
and this process continues until it can no longer decrease its consumption. Once the 
household reaches this point, it has to decrease its capital to sustain its minimum level of 
consumption and eventually loses all its capital.  
 The valuation of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡 by a household with smaller persistent economic rents 
tends to be higher than the valuation by a household with larger persistent economic rents 
by the same reasoning described above. As a result, the amount of capital of a household 
with larger persistent economic rents increases more than the amount of a household with 
smaller persistent economic rents. Therefore, the ratio of capital owned by households 
with relatively larger persistent economic rents to all capital in the economy increases, 
and thereby 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) and rt decrease for the reason that households with larger persistent 
economic rents tends to perceive (guess) lower values of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡 and behave on the basis of 
these values. These decreases in 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) and rt, will cause the perceived (guessed) values 
of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑡  of some households with comparatively smaller persistent economic rents to 
become higher than the value of rt, and therefore these households also eventually lose 
all capital according to the same reasoning as for households without persistent economic 
rents. This process continues until all capital is owned by the household with the largest 
persistent economic rents. Hence, the steady state is a corner solution.            ■ 
 
If households are heterogeneous except for the amount of persistent rent incomes and they 
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behave unilaterally, therefore, there is no steady state other than corner solutions. That is, 
the outcome of the problem arising from heterogeneity in persistent rent incomes under 
the MDC-based procedure is equivalent to that under the RTP-based procedure.  
 
3.3  Sustainable heterogeneity under the MDC-based procedure 
Harashima (2012, 2017a) showed that sustainable heterogeneity (SH) exists under the 
RTP-based procedure, and Harashima (2019) showed that if households behave 
according to Rule 2-1 and 2-2 and the government behaves according to Rule 3, an 
approximate SH exists under the MDC-based procedure. 
 In addition, Harashima (2020a) showed that even in the case that persistent 
economic rents are distributed heterogeneously among households, an SH is also 
achieved under the RTP-based procedure. By the same logic as shown in Harashima 
(2019), it can be easily shown that an approximate SH also exists for the case in which 
persistent economic rents are distributed heterogeneously under the MDC-based 
procedure, if households behave according to Rules 2-1 and 2-2, and the government 
behaves according to Rule 3. Furthermore, even if households behave completely 
unilaterally, i.e., they still behave according to Rules 1-1 and 1-2 in a population of 
heterogeneous households, an approximate SH can be still achieved if the government 
resolutely determines to achieve an approximate SH and strictly behaves according to 
Rule 3. 
 
4  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
If preferences of households are heterogeneous, there is no guarantee that a steady state 
exists other than corner solutions, and therefore, only the most advantaged household will 
eventually possess all the capital in the economy (Becker 1980). In addition, if households 
obtain economic rents persistently and unevenly, there is also no guarantee under the 
RTP-based procedure that a steady state exists other than corner solutions (Harashima 
2020a).  
 Harashima (2019) showed that the MDC- and RTP-based procedures are 
equivalent, and therefore, it is predicted that even under the MDC-based procedure, if 
households obtain economic rents persistently and unevenly, there is also no guarantee 
that a steady state exists other than corner solutions. In this paper, I have shown that there 
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